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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
19 September 1961

OCI No. 4009/61

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Congo

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1.

[redacted] Arthur Doucy, a socialist member of the faculty of the Free University of Brussels, and a former head of the Solvay Institute of Sociology. Doucy has traveled to the Congo on various occasions, and in the period prior to the Congo's independence was an advisor to a coalition of moderate Congo parties. He is said to be close to Foreign Minister Spaak. Doucy has endorsed the UN's action in removing some of the more radical Belgian advisors from Katanga, and appears to hold moderate views on most Congo matters.

2. In his conversation with Ambassador MacArthur, Doucy made a number of statements concerning growing Communist influence in the Congo's central government. His main points can be summarized as follows: (1) Gizenga's adherents have been successful in penetrating

State Department review completed

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key areas of the government; (2) Communist-oriented members of the government, under the direction of Pierre Mulele, are waging a concerted offensive against Adoula; (3) anti-Communist members of the government are being effectively neutralized; (4) the Belgrade conference has served to increase Gizenga's stature among uncommitted nations relative to that of Adoula.

3. With respect to the first point, Gizenga's followers are strongly represented in the Adoula government. Out of 27 cabinet posts, between nine and twelve are occupied by one-time associates of Gizenga. However, except for the vice premiership occupied by Gizenga himself, and the interior ministry occupied by Christophe Gbenye--who has recently re-asserted his extremism in connection with the Bocheley-Davidson appointment and attempted expulsion of Belgian representatives in Leopoldville, most posts allocated to the Gizengists are non-sensitive in character.

4. While there is always a danger that Gizenga will secure control of key working-level posts, we feel that Doucy's concern over the naming of Gizengists largely to foreign ministry posts stems from apprehensions for his friend Foreign Minister Bomboko.

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Moreover, we would tend to regard any action by Adoula to appoint Gizengists to ambassadorships as designed to place them in non-sensitive posts. While there have been indications that Bomboko's influence has diminished, this trend appears to reflect primarily Bomboko's lack of close rapport with Adoula.

5. We share Doucy's apprehension concerning the appointment of Egide Bocheley-Davidson as commissioner to Katanga, although the presence of two other commissioners suggests that he will not have a free hand. Doucy's characterization of Mulele as Communist oriented appears correct, although he exaggerates Mulele's influence on the current Congo scene. Mulele continues to reside in Cairo, where he was Gizenga's special representative to the UAR, and appears alone in his advocacy of a "tough" policy towards the Adoula government.

6. State Department reporting tends to confirm that Tito sought to "build up" Gizenga at the Belgrade conference at Adoula's expense. It is doubtful, however, that he was successful. Mulele recently characterized himself as "disappointed" at the moderate stand taken by Adoula at Belgrade, and privately conceded that Adoula had made a "good impression" at the conference.

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7. While we agree with Doucy's assessment of certain individuals, we feel that he has given a somewhat darker view than we hold.

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